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Download Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964 (Nuclear History Program) fb2, epub

by John Baylis

Download Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964 (Nuclear History Program) fb2, epub

ISBN: 0198280122
Author: John Baylis
Language: English
Publisher: Clarendon Press; 1 edition (February 1, 1996)
Pages: 512
Category: Military
Subcategory: History
Rating: 4.5
Votes: 800
Size Fb2: 1228 kb
Size ePub: 1138 kb
Size Djvu: 1587 kb
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Ambiguity and Deterrence focuses on the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategy between 1945 and 1964

Ambiguity and Deterrence focuses on the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategy between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, it is argued that the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy.

Ambiguity and Deterrence focuses on the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategy between 1945 and 1964

Ambiguity and Deterrence focuses on the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategy between 1945 and 1964.

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The United Kingdom was the third country (after the United States and the Soviet Union) to develop and test nuclear weapons, and is one of the five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The United Kingdom was the third country (after the United States and the Soviet Union) to develop and test nuclear weapons, and is one of the five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The UK initiated a nuclear weapons programme, codenamed Tube Alloys, during the Second World War. At the Quebec Conference in August 1943, it was merged with the American Manhattan Project.

Based on recently released documents, the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity.

Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964. 1 The literature on Anglo-American nuclear diplomacy is vast and growing. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy. Still indispensable are Botti, Timothy . The Long Wait: The Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945–1958 (New York, 1987); and Gowing, Margaret, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, 2 vols.

Nuclear weapons - Government policy - Great Britain. This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Great Britain - Politics and government - 1945-1964. Nuclear weapons - Policies - Of - Government - History. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.

Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964. Financial support was provided by the Nuclear History Program and Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control. The European Parliament and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future. 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). 2. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), p. 283.

See in particular, J. Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945–1964 (OUP, 1995); I. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957–1962 (OUP, 1994); J. Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership. Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance 1952–1959 (Groningen: Styx, 1993)Google Scholar. S. Twigge and L. Scott, Fail Deadly? Britain and the Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964 (Aberystwyth: Nuclear History Program Report, 1997).

Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964. Atomic Assistance: How Atoms for Peace Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Baylis, John and Robert O’Neill, eds. Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World. A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race, Vol. 1: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics. Denver, CO: Praeger, 2013. Burns, Richard Dean and Philip E. Coyle III. The Challenges of Nuclear Non- Proliferation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012. Furman, Necah Stewart. Scandia National Laboratories: The Postwar Decade.

Ambiguity and Deterrence focuses on the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategy between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, it is argued that the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy. These disagreements centred on six main questions: whether deterrence was best achieved through "punishment" or "denial"; whether detterence necessitated nuclear superiority; whether preparations had to be made for a long war or a short war; what strategic implications followed from nuclear stalemate; whether limited nuclear wars could be fought without escalation to all-out nuclear war; and whether pre-emption was politically acceptable and militarily necessary. It is argued that the failure of successive governments to provide clear political direction on these issues meant that British nuclear strategy was more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.

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