The main reason I enjoyed reading Mussolini Warlord is that there are so few modern takes on the subject of Italy's war. I found it very interesting and informative on the motivations, capabilities, and failures of judgment by the leaders of Fascist Italy. Mussolini's pathetic attempts to keep up with Hitler in the empire building department would be laughable if they hadn't caused so much human suffering in the Balkans, Africa, and in Italy itself. In the book Mussolini goes from a seemingly strong but reckless leader to Hitler's propaganda puppet in charge of an Italian rump state under Nazi occupation. I found it fascinating that so little thought went into Italy's invasion of Greece, and that the Italian army was so poorly led in Europe. In Africa the troops were led better and performed well. However, this was due in part to the support of the Germans under Rommel and von Arnim. In the book, Mussolini comes off as a petulant child with no coherent strategic vision and an overwhelming desire to create an empire before Germany grabbed up all of the glory and resources. According to the author (he makes a convincing point), one of the biggest mistakes made by Mussolini was sending some of the best Italian troops to the eastern front (in yet another attempt to show Hitler how powerful Italy was) when they were not needed in that theater, and played only a minor role. The troops would have been better used to stabilize the Balkans or assist in the attack on Egypt. Mussolini was definitely Hitler's junior partner. However, he was a major part of the Axis and I am glad someone took the time to tell this overlooked story. I wished that the author would have described the East African campaigns in a little more detail (if only from the Italian high command's perspective). However, that is my only complaint about this otherwise wonderful book.

Burgwyn is a long time student of modern Italian political history. He has made excellent use of German and Italian documents and historical scholarship. This is a topic that has needed a serious study in English on what Mussolini and the Italian military accomplished and their failures in World War II. MUSSOLINI WARLORD is a good first step. But it is NOT a serious study of Mussolini and the Italian military. It is primarily a political study of the regime in WWII.
Burgwyn does not take the time early in his study to discuss in detail the state of the Italian military. So the concept of the Binary Division (two infantry regiments to a division), utilized by all but two divisions in the Italian army, is not mentioned. So, the reader is left with the impression that Greek, Italian or British divisions are all of similar size, when they were vastly different. He does point out that the substantial majority of field artillery was of World War I vintage and the use of obsolete Italian tanks, but does not discuss in any detail the Italian navy and summarizes the Italian air force quite well but in all of two pages. The good use of large AT guns (truck-mounted naval guns, the Italian 90mm and purchased German 88mm) by the Italian army is referred to only as German 88mm guns. This is a classic example of a problem that many academics have in writing about the military. They are often limited in their understanding of the TO&E of armies and military technology.
The fighting in Italian East Africa covers all of small parts of two pages. There is no mention of the South African, Nigerian or Indian contributions to the Allied fighting there. In fact, the term British is often used to cover Australian and Indian troops in North Africa. And a regiment of Bersaglieri (light infantry) is turned into a division (p148). The Giovani Fascisti suddenly appear in the summer of '42 when they had fought well during Operation Crusader. The Venezia division is mentioned as fighting partisans in the Soviet Union (p218), well that is due in large part as it was designed as a rear area Occupation Division. It was designed precisely for that role and is not discussed (it had even less artillery than most Italian divisions). And Pearl Harbor now takes place on November 7. So there are errors of detail (and less than robust editing).
He has a good discussion of the fighting in the Balkans and his expertise on the occupation of France, Yugoslavia and Albania shines through. He has a solid discussion of the fighting (and extent of atrocities) in the Soviet Union. But the submarine service, which fought in the Atlantic as well as the Mediterranean is not mentioned in the former and but a little in the latter, and the Italian Special Forces X MAS gets a paragraph.
The author literally in the last paragraph goes back to the 1935-36 Abyssinian War. Burgwyn states that Mussolini validated his view that he was a great warlord, viewed that war as a success - his success. With that I agree - that is the starting point of understanding Musso as a Warlord. Of course his other failures before and during World War II were profound. His illusion of being a warlord doomed him, his Party and much of his nation.
I am glad I got this and read through it. It has some interesting insights, such as a possible Vichy-Italian naval raid on Alexandria after the British attacks in early July 1940. It needs to be expanded and some of the numerous maps definitely need to be improved. If I could have, I would have given it 3.5 Stars.

Disclaimer: I have co-authored three books on the fighting Italy participated in as well as two self-published booklets on the Italian military in World War II.

This was a very good read. Italy in WWII is still a subject that does not get enough attention in my opinion. This book helps fill that void.
My only issues with this book was that the author did not spend enough time or detail on the Italian armed forces.
The campaigns against the Senusi Arab tribes in the 20s & 30s is hardly mentioned, and the East African campaign only gets about
half a page. All in all it is still a good read.